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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY

BURDICKv. TAKUSHI:
UPHOLDING HAWAII'S BAN
ON WRITE-IN VOTING
1.

INTRODUCTION

In Burdick v. Takushi, l the Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii's
ban on write-in voting did not violate an individual's
constitutional rights to freedom of expression, freedom of
association, or freedom of political speech.2 The court held
that the right to cast a write-in vote is not a fundamental
right. s
II.

FACTS

Alan Burdick notified Hawaii's Director of Elections and
the Lieutenant Governor that he wanted to cast write-in
votes in the 1986 primary elections and in future elections.·
He was advised by those officials that Hawaii's election laws
did not provide for write-in votes; thus his votes would be
ignored. 6
Burdick, a lawyer, originally filed suit in the United States
District Court for the district of Hawaii, claiming that his
1. 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were
Skopil, J. and Fernandez, J.).
2. [d. at 420-21.
3. [d. at 420.
4. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. [d.
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constitutional rights to freedom of expression and association
were violated, and attacking Hawaii's election laws on both
state and federal constitutional grounds,6 The district court
granted summary judgment, holding the failure to provide
for write-in voting constituted a violation of Burdick's rights
of freedom of expression and association,7 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, directing the district court not to reach the federal
constitutional issue under the Pullman abstention doctrine,S
On remand the district court certified three questions to the
Hawaii Supreme Court to determine if Hawaii's election laws
actually prohibited write-in voting,9 In July 1989 the Hawaii
Supreme Court issued its response indicating that Hawaii's
election laws did prohibit write-in voting,tO Burdick renewed his
motion for summary judgment, which the district court
6.Id.
7. Id. at 417. The court issued a preliminary injunction directing the State .to
provide for the casting and counting of write-in votes in the November 1986 primary
statewide elections. The State moved for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending
appeal, and the motion was denied. The State appealed the denial of the stay to the
Ninth Circuit, which granted the stay pending appeal of the case. Id.
8. See Burdick v. Takushi, 846 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1988). -CAl definitive resolution
of the unsettled question whether Hawaii's election laws actually prohibit write-in
voting might obviate the need for a federal court to decide the federal constitutional
question .... • Id. at 589. See also Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
498 (1941). The Pullman abstention doctrine was created to allow the federal courts
to abstain from addressing issues of federal law without specific rulings on applicable
state law. Id. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-step analysis for determining
whether the Pullman abstention doctrine is applicable. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Burdick, 846 F.2d at 588. These three steps are:
(1) the proper resolution of the state law question at issue must be uncertain; (2) a
definitive ruling on the state issue must potentially obviate the need for constitutional
adjudication by the federal court; and (3) the complaint must touch on a sensitive area
of social policy that the federal courts should not enter into unless there is no other
alternative except adjudication of that social policy.Id. The Ninth Circuit determined
that all three of these criteria were met and the Pullman abstention doctrine was
warranted. Id. at 588-589.
9. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 417. The three questions were:
1. Does the Constitution of the State of Hawaii require
Hawaii's election officials to permit the casting of writein votes and require Hawaii's election officials to count
and publish write-in votes?
2. Do Hawaii's election laws require Hawaii's election
officials to permit the casting of write-in votes and require
Hawaii's election officials to count and publish write-in
votes?
3. Do Hawaii's election laws permit, but not require,
Hawaii's election officials to allow voters to cast write-in
votes, and to count and publish write-in votes?
Id.
10. Burdick v. Takushi, 70 Haw. 498, 776 P.2d 824 (1989). The answer to each
of the three questions was no.Id. at 499,776 P.2d at 825.
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granted. ll The State filed a timely appeal of the summary
judgment to the Ninth Circuit. I2
III.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit addressed three issues: first, whether
Burdick had proper standing to sue,I3 second, whether the
right to vote for a candidate of one's choice is a fundamental
right,I4 and finally, whether the district court failed to give full
faith and credit to the Hawaii Supreme Court's ruling. I6
A.

STANDING TO SUE

The State of Hawaii claimed that Burdick did not have
proper standing to sue because he was ineligible to participate
in several of the elections affected by the preliminary
injunction. IS The State also argued that Burdick had "failed to
identify a particular candidate for whom he want[ed] to cast his
write-in vote. "17 To establish standing to sue, a party must
show that he or she has personally suffered some injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant. I8 The party
must also show the injury can be linked to the challenged
action, and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. "19
The Ninth Circuit disposed of this claim by pointing out that
the State did not contend any difference in the way the
prohibition would be applied to the various elections within the
state. 20 The prohibition was effective state-wide without
restrictions or exceptions. 21 Finding Burdick was affected
11. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F.Supp. 582 (D. Haw. 1990). The district court
again held that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting impermissibly infringed upon
Burdick's constitutional rights of expression and association. ld. at 592. The court
issued another preliminary injunction against the State and granted the State's
motion for a stay pending appeal. ld. at 592-93.
12. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 417.
13. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415,417 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. ld. at 419.
15. ld. at 421.
16. ld. at 417. Because the election laws were applied to all elections within the
state, Burdick was ineligible to vote in some elections outside his county. ld.
17. Burdick, 937 F.2d at417.
18. ld. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982».
19. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 417.
20.ld.at417-18.
21. ld. at 418.
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personally by the general state-wide ban on write-in voting, the
Ninth Circuit concluded he had standing to sue. 22
B.

WRITE-IN VOTING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The right to vote is guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. 23 In addition, the rights to cast one's vote
effectively and to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs are guaranteed by the first24 and fourteenth26 amendments.
The state may not burden these rights excessively.26
In Anderson v. Celebrezze 27 the Supreme Court provided an
analytical process for determining the validity of a challenge to
a specific provision in a state's election laws. The Anderson
court's two-step analysis first directs consideration toward the
character and magnitude of the injury to the plaintiff's asserted
first and fourteenth amendment rights. 28 Second, the court must
"identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
22. [d. See also Erum v. Cayetano, 881 F.2d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hawaii voter
has standing to challenge the whole of the State election laws creating ballot-access
restrictions ).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides in part that "the House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States .... " [d. This has been interpreted to grant to persons qualified to vote "a
constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. I, 17 (1964). The Wesber". court also stated that:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. [d.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 reads, in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
26. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 418. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1968). The Williams court examined Ohio election laws that made it virtually
impossible for new political parties, or old parties with few members, to appear on the
ballot for presidential electors. [d. at 30. The court held that the election laws
resulted in a denial of equal protection and were unconstitutional. [d. at 31.
27. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
28. [d. at 789.
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State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule."29
Balancing these conflicting interests enables the court to
determine the constitutionality of the challenged provision of the
state's election law. 80 The Ninth Circuit applied this analysis to
the challenged Hawaiian election laws to hold that Burdick's
constitutional rights were not violated by HawaWs ban on writein voting. 3t

1.

Character and Magnitude of the Alleged Injury

Burdick asserted that the right to vote for a candidate of
one's choice is a fundamental right. 32 The Ninth Circuit noted
that the United States Supreme Court has never expressly
addressed the issue of whether the right to cast a write-in
vote is a fundamental one. 33 However, various related issues
regarding write-in voting have been addressed by the Supreme
Court, and these opinions provide conflicting messages. M
29. Id. The legitimacy and strength of those state interests, as well as the extent
to which they make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights, should be considered. Id.
30. Id.
31. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 418-21. The challenged statutes include Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 12-1 (all candidates for elective office, except as provided in § 14·21, shall be
nominated in accordance with this chapter); § 12-2 (no person shall be a candidate for any
general or special general election unless nominated in the immediately preceding
primary or special primary); § 12-22 (shall be only one primary or special primary
ballot, clearly designated as nonpartisan, containing names of all nonpartisan candidates
to be voted for and offices for which they are candidates). Haw. Rev. Stat. Chap. 12 governs
primary elections; the chapter does not expressly forbid write-in votes at primary
elections. Burdick v. Takushi, 70 Haw. 498, 776 P.2d 824, 825 (1989). The exceptions in
§ 14-21, referred to in § 12-1, pertain to the election of presidential electors.
32. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 418.
33. Id. at 420 n.3.
34. Id. Compare Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) with Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
In Storer the Supreme Court considered a California statute barring independent
candidates from the ballot if they had a registered affiliation with a qualified political
party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. The
Court found that this statute was constitutional because the state's compelling
interest in maintaining the integrity of the ballot process outweighed the infringement
on the voters' rights. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735-36.
In Anderson the Court held that an Ohio statute requiring independent presidential
candidates to file a statement of candidacy and nominating petition eight months prior
to the November general election placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and
association rights of a candidate's supporters. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805-806.
In Lubin the Court considered another California statute, one requiring every
candidate to pay a filing fee to obtain nomination papers. The Court held that "absent
reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with
constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees that he
cannot pay; denying a person the right to file as a candidate solely because of an
inability to pay a fixed fee, without providing any alternative means, is not reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate interest of maintaining the
integrity of elections." Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716-18.
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The Ninth Circuit determined that the fundamental nature
of the right to vote is rooted in the "citizen's right to have a voice
in the selection of those who govern"36 but does not exist "in a
vacuum. "36 Certain processes govern who may run for office37
and how elections are conducted;38 therefore, there is not an
unlimited right to vote for any particular candidate. 39
In determining the magnitude of the alleged injury, the court
looked to Hawaii's election laws as a whole and how they
impinged upon Burdick's right to free political speech.40 The
Ninth Circuit found that Hawaii's election laws provide qualified
candidates with relatively easy access to the ballots. 41 In addition,
the court found the prohibition to be content-neutral, applying
equally to all write-in votes in all elections. 42 Because it is contentneutral, the Ninth Circuit determined that the prohibition could
be classified as one regulating time, place, or manner of speech. 43
The court considered a ban on write-in voting to be a reasonable
restriction on the manner of speech; thus, the impingement
upon Burdick's right to political speech was minimal." The court
further reasoned that the prohibition on write-in voting "does not
35. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 419.
36.1d.
37. The United States Constitution contains several limitations on candidates
for certain offices. See, e.g., Art. I, § 2 (restricting congressional candidates by a
requirement that each be at least 25 years old with a minimum of seven years
citizenship); Art. II, § 1 (restricting presidential candidates to those at least 35 years
old who are natural born citizens and providing that in a presidential election, the voter
casts his or her vote for an Elector rather than for an individual candidate).
38. Numerous Supreme Court cases have upheld various restrictions placed
upon the election process. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)
(incumbent Justice of the Peace denied right to seek election to state legislature, and
state and county office holders deemed automatically resigned if they run for another
elective office); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (state can require candidate to
sever affiliation with political party one year prior to election in order to run as
independent candidate); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (state
can deny place on ballot to frivolous candidate by requiring candidates to demonstrate
a significant, measurable quantum of community support).
39. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 419.
40.1d.
41. 1d. Hawaii's election laws provide that a candidate for county office or the
legislature may gain access to the primary ballot by submitting a petition with the
signatures of fifteen eligible voters; a candidate for Congress, governor, lieutenant
governor, or the board of education must have twenty- five signatures. Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 12-5 (Supp. 1990). A new political party may gain a place on the ballot by submitting
a petition with signatures of 1% of the total registered state voters as of the last
election. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-62.
42. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 419.
43. 1d.·A restriction that regulates only the time, place or manner of speech may
be imposed so long as it is reasonable.· Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
44. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 419.
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restrict the alternative channels available to [him] for expressing
his political views,"46 and stated that a voter's wish to say that no
candidate is acceptable does not mean that the voter has the
fundamental right to say that on the ballot. 48
The Ninth Circuit concluded that although the voter "has
a protected right to voice his opinion and attempt to influence
others," there is no guarantee that a voter may voice any
specific opinion through the ballot-box. 47 Consequently, there
are no fundamental constitutional protections to vote for any
candidate that a voter chooses. 48

2.

State Interests Sought to be Protected

The State of Hawaii argued that it sought to protect three
state interests by its ban on write-in voting: political stability,
voter education, and protecting the internal structure of the
State's election laws.49
To support its interest in political stability, the State
claimed that its prohibition on write-in voting avoids "sore
loser" candidacies and "party raiding. "50 The court found that
the write-in voting ban assures that sore losers do not "sidestep
the ballot access requirements" and prevents voters from
circumventing Hawaii's ban on cross-over voting. 51
Hawaii also argued that write-in candidacies would confuse
the election process by not providing voters with sufficient
information upon which to base their votes. 52 The Ninth Circuit
45. [d. The Ninth Circuit did not suggest what alternative channels might be

appropriate.
46.
47.
48.
49.

•

[d. at 420.
[d.
[d.
[d.

50. [d. A "sore loser" candidacy occurs when a nominee loses a primary election
and then later gathers enough support to beat the primary winner in the general
election. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 784 n.2; Storer, 415 U.S. at 735. "Party raiding"
(also known as "cross-over voting") occurs when "voters in sympathy with one party
designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine the
results of the other party's primary." Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
The Supreme Court has held that these are legitimate interests. See Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986) (states have a compelling interest
in ensuring that unrestrained factionalism does not damage the election process).
51. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 420. Cross-over voting is another term for party raiding.
See supra note 50.
52. [d. The Supreme Court has held that there is a legitimate state interest in
"fostering an informed and educated electorate." [d.; see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796.
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found that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting legitimately protected
the State's interest in voter education by ensuring candidates'
early appearance on the ballot, giving voters ample opportunity
to examine a candidate's qualifications and political views. 63
The State of Hawaii also asserted that this challenged
prohibition was designed to protect the integrity of its election
process. u Under Hawaii election law, a candidate who is
unopposed in a primary is automatically seated in the general
election. 66 Allowing for write-in votes would nullify the statute
because a candidate unopposed in a primary by any candidate
running on any other ticket could still be challenged in the
general election by a write-in candidate. 56 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit found that the prohibition legitimately protected the
integrity of Hawaii's election system. 67

3.

Balancing the Injury Against the State's Interest

In balancing the amount of infringement on Burdick's
rights against the State of Hawaii's interests protected by the
ban on write-in voting, the Ninth Circuit held that the modest
53. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 420.
54. 1d. The Supreme Court has held that this is a compelling state interest. Eu
v. San Francisco City Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1986).
55. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 12-41 states:
[A]ny candidate for any county office who is the sole
candidate for that office at the primary or special primary
election, or who would not be opposed in the general or
special general election by any candidate running on any
other ticket, nonpartisan or otherwise, and who is
nominated at the primary or special primary election
shall ... be declared to be duly and legally elected to the
office for which the person was a candidate regardless of
the number of votes received by that candidate.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 12-42 states:
(a) Any candidate running for any office in the State of
Hawaii in a special election or special primary election
who is the sole candidate for that office shall, after the
close of filing of nomination papers, be deemed and
declared to be duly and legally elected to the office ....
(b) Any candidate running for any office in the State of Hawaii
in a special general election who was only opposed
by ... candidates running on the same ticket in the special
primary election and is not opposed by any candidate running
on any other ticket, nonpartisan or otherwise, and is
nominated at the special primary election shall ... be deemed
and declared to be duly and legally elected to the office....
56. See Burdick, 937 F.2d at 420.
57.1d.
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restriction on Burdick's rights of expression and association
were justified. 68 The court reasoned that "in light of the ease of
access to Hawaii's ballots, the alternatives available to Burdick
for expressing his political beliefs, the State's broad powers to
regulate elections, and the specific interests advanced by the
State," the ban on write-in voting did not "impermissibly
infringe" upon Burdick's rights. 69

4.

Rejection of Fourth Circuit View

The Ninth Circuit recognized that its holding was
inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dixon v.
Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws. 60 The
Dixon court held that the casting and counting of write-in
votes implicated fundamental rights. 61 The Fourth Circuit
considered that a vote is still constitutionally significant even
if cast for a long-shot or fictional candidate because the right to
vote for the candidate of one's choice includes the right to say
that no candidate is acceptable. 62 Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the expression of this viewpoint, in the
form of a write-in vote, is a constitutionally protected right. 63
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning. 64 The court's position was that the Fourth Circuit
failed to distinguish between the right to participate equally in the
election of those who govern and the right to try to influence the
election process. 66 The Ninth Circuit agreed, however, that hope
of being able to propagate one's views and to increase one's ability
to influence the outcome of an election might be constitutionally
protected rights. 66 The court's failure to follow the Fourth Circuit's
decision stemmed from its belief that a prohibition on write-in
58. [d. at 421.
59. [d. at 420-21.

60. 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
61. [d. at 782. The challenged election law in Dixon required candidates for certain

city offices to pay a $150 filing fee in order to qualify as an "official" write-in candidate.
Only official write-in candidates could have the votes cast for them publicly reported
and attain office. [d.
62. [d. The Dixon court further reasoned that write-in votes are used "in the hope,
however slim; that the votes will be successful in propagating the voter's views to
increase his or her influence. [d.
63. [d. There was no petition for a writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court
in the Dixon case.
64. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 421.
65. [d.
66. [d.
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voting does not substantially burden that hope. 67 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that this hope is not significantly burdened
because there are numerous other methods available for
propagating a voter's views and increasing a voter's
influence. 66
C.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT GIVEN TO STATE COURT RULING

The State of Hawaii argued that Burdick was required to
explicitly reserve his federal arguments when the three
questions on Hawaii state law were certified to the Hawaii
Supreme Court.69 The State engaged in some contorted
reasoning to support this argument. The Hawaiian Constitution
is very similar to United States Constitution; therefore, Burdick
should have limited his arguments before the Hawaii Supreme
Court to the "textually distinct provisions of Hawaii law. "70
Burdick did not so limit his arguments; thus, he elected to seek
a "comprehensive and final adjudication of his rights in the
state court."71
The Ninth Circuit found no merit in the State's contention. 72
The court noted that the parties had stipulated that the three
questions should be certified to state court.7S The district
court's order implied that if the district court was required to
re-address the federal constitutional question after the state
court's ruling, the district court would do so consistently with
its prior ruling. 7•
The Ninth Circuit held that Burdick did not waive his
right to have the federal claims heard by the federal court;
consequently, the federal court did give full faith and credit to
the state court's ruling on the three certified questions. 76
67. [d.
68. [d. However, the Ninth Circuit did not give any suggestions of other methods

available for a voter to use to propagate views or increase influence.
69. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 1991).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

[d.
[d.
See id.
Burdick, 937 F.2d at 422.
[d. If Hawaii's law permitted but did not expressly provide for write-in
votes, there would be no federal constitutional issue to decide. [d. However, if there

was an actual prohibition on write-in voting, the district court reserved the right to
address the federal constitutional question presented. [d.
75. [d.
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CONCLUSION

In Burdick v. Takushi 78 the Ninth Circuit held that there is
no fundamental right to cast a write-in vote. 77 The court also
held that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting is not an infringement
of a voter's constitutional rights to freedom of political speech
and association. 78
Although the Fourth Circuit's holding is not binding on the
Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit avoided the opportunity to
build on a sound course of law. The fundamental rights of free
political speech and association logically should include the
right to have our votes counted, regardless of the candidate
voted for.
In December 1991 the Supreme Court granted the petition
for writ of certiorari that was filed in August. 79 We should
hope, as we enter an election year, that the Supreme Court will
reverse Burdick and approve the Dixon holding, thus
confirming that write-in voting is part of our fundamental
right to vote.
Elizabeth E. Deighton *

76. 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. [d. at 416.
78. [d. at 420·21.

79. Burdick v. Takushi, 116 L.Ed.2d 653 (1991).
Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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